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Single Idea 12529
[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
]
Full Idea
I call a name 'sortal' from 'sort', as I do 'general' from 'genus'.
Gist of Idea
I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort'
Source
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.03.15)
Book Ref
Locke,John: 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', ed/tr. Nidditch,P.H. [OUP 1979], p.417
The
40 ideas
with the same theme
[picking out things by giving their kind]:
12351
|
Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance
[Aristotle, by Wedin]
|
16156
|
Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause
[Aristotle]
|
12280
|
Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do
[Aristotle]
|
12529
|
I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort'
[Locke]
|
17511
|
Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use
[Ayers]
|
17510
|
Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it
[Ayers]
|
17522
|
We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity
[Ayers]
|
17515
|
Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts
[Ayers]
|
15834
|
Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence
[Brody, by Mackie,P]
|
13128
|
'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories
[Westerhoff on Wiggins]
|
10679
|
'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind
[Wiggins, by Hossack]
|
14363
|
Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions
[Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
|
14364
|
A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution
[Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
|
11896
|
A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation
[Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
|
15835
|
Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation
[Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
|
11841
|
The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star
[Wiggins]
|
11851
|
Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals
[Wiggins]
|
11865
|
The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it
[Wiggins]
|
16495
|
The only singling out is singling out 'as' something
[Wiggins]
|
16501
|
In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is
[Wiggins]
|
16506
|
Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence
[Wiggins]
|
12055
|
Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?'
[Wiggins]
|
12059
|
A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river
[Wiggins]
|
12063
|
Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals
[Wiggins]
|
12051
|
If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances
[Wiggins]
|
12053
|
'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees
[Wiggins]
|
12054
|
Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations
[Wiggins]
|
12052
|
We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other'
[Wiggins]
|
13868
|
Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals
[Wright,C]
|
16235
|
Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal'
[Burke,M, by Hawley]
|
14753
|
The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties
[Burke,M, by Sider]
|
13388
|
It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence
[Jubien]
|
8291
|
Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind
[Lowe]
|
14745
|
If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are
[Sider]
|
12860
|
Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions
[Simons]
|
14082
|
No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup'
[Schaffer,J]
|
7926
|
We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens
[Macdonald,C]
|
14193
|
'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal
[Paul,LA]
|
14195
|
If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort
[Paul,LA]
|
14196
|
Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals
[Paul,LA]
|