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Single Idea 12552

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism ]

Full Idea

How any thought should produce a motion in body is as remote from the nature of our ideas, as how any body should produce any thought in the mind.

Gist of Idea

Thoughts moving bodies, and bodies producing thoughts, are equally unknowable

Source

John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.03.28)

Book Ref

Locke,John: 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', ed/tr. Nidditch,P.H. [OUP 1979], p.559


A Reaction

Compare McGinn's Idea 2540. Locke was a thoroughgoing Mysterian, but in his case it was part of a widespread pessimism about penetrating any of the inner secrets of nature. Modern Mysterians see it as the one secret we can't get.

Related Idea

Idea 2540 Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn]


The 13 ideas with the same theme [we are incapable of explaining the mind-body link]:

There are no secure foundations to prove the separate existence of mind, in reason or experience [William of Ockham]
Thinking without matter and matter that thinks are equally baffling [Locke]
We can't begin to conceive what would produce some particular experience within our minds [Locke]
Thoughts moving bodies, and bodies producing thoughts, are equally unknowable [Locke]
Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life? [Wittgenstein]
Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle]
Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel]
We can't be objective about experience [Nagel]
Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn]
McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn]
Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford]
Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers]
The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil]