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Single Idea 12557

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence ]

Full Idea

Our ideas of substance being supposed copies, and referred to archetypes within us, must still be taken from something that does or has existed; they must not consist of ideas put together at the pleasure of our thoughts.

Gist of Idea

Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world

Source

John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.04.12)

Book Ref

Locke,John: 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', ed/tr. Nidditch,P.H. [OUP 1979], p.568


A Reaction

This is a begrudging concession from Locke, who has been rather sarcastic about our supposed knowledge of substance. His is a realist about the physical world, and rightly says that our ideas are shaped by externals. We just don't have the evidence.


The 29 ideas with the same theme [essence as derived from experiences of objects]:

If you remove the accidents from a horse and a lion, the intellect can't tell them apart [Francis of Marchia]
The feature which picks out or names a thing is usually called its 'essence' [Hobbes]
Real essence explains observable qualities, but not what kind of thing it is [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
If essence is 'nominal', artificial gold (with its surface features) would qualify as 'gold' [Locke, by Eagle]
'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Locke, by Copi]
The observable qualities are never the real essence, since they depend on real essence [Locke]
In nominal essence, Locke confuses the set of properties with the abstracted idea of them [Eagle on Locke]
Locke's real and nominal essence refers back to Aristotle's real and nominal definitions [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached [Locke]
Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish [Locke]
Real essences are unknown, so only the nominal essence connects things to a species [Locke]
To be a nominal essence, a complex idea must exhibit unity [Locke]
Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world [Locke]
For 'all gold is malleable' to be necessary, it must be part of gold's nominal essence [Locke]
Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive [Locke]
We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz]
If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz]
Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley]
In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi]
'Real essence' makes it what it is; 'nominal essence' makes us categorise it a certain way [Ellis]
The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins]
Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins]
Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences' [Dennett]
We distinguish objects by their attributes, not by their essences [Shalkowski]
We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross]
If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle]
Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle]
Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle]
Kripke and Putnam offer an intermediary between real and nominal essences [Almog]