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Single Idea 12569

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism ]

Full Idea

The notice we have by our senses of the existing of things without us, thought it be no altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge or the deductions of our reason, ..yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge.

Gist of Idea

Knowledge by senses is less certain than that by intuition or reason, but it is still knowledge

Source

John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.11.03)

Book Ref

Locke,John: 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', ed/tr. Nidditch,P.H. [OUP 1979], p.631

A Reaction

This is a clear instance of an acceptance of fallibilism. So one would hope, I think, from an orthodox empiricist philosopher, especially a representative realist like Locke, who as lots of areas where doubts can creep in.

The 13 ideas with the same theme [beliefs can counts as knowledge even if they are not certain]:

12569 Knowledge by senses is less certain than that by intuition or reason, but it is still knowledge [Locke]
14768 Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce]
14770 Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce]
19107 Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce]
22870 No belief can be so settled that it is not subject to further inquiry [Dewey]
17637 The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict [Russell]
12897 To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction [Lewis]
2755 If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J]
6898 Fallibilism is the view that all knowledge-claims are provisional [Mautner]
19701 Fallibilism is consistent with dogmatism or scepticism, and is not alternative to them [Dougherty]
19700 It is best to see the fallibility in the reasons, rather than in the agents or the knowledge [Dougherty]
19702 We can't normally say that we know something 'but it might be false' [Dougherty]
19718 Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann]