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Single Idea 12579
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
]
Full Idea
Perceptual experience has a second layer of nonconceptual representational content, distinct from immediate 'scenarios' and from conceptual contents. These additional contents I call 'protopropositions', containing an individual and a property/relation.
Gist of Idea
Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts
Source
Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992], 3.3)
Book Ref
Peacocke,Christopher: 'A Study of Concepts' [MIT 1999], p.77
A Reaction
When philosophers start writing this sort of thing, I want to turn to neuroscience and psychology. I suppose the philosopher's justification for this sort of speculation is epistemological, but I see no good coming of it.
The
21 ideas
with the same theme
[inference is an essential part of perception]:
1544
|
Perception must be an internal matter, because we can fail to perceive when we are preoccupied
[Diogenes of Apollonia, by Theophrastus]
|
5220
|
Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation
[Aristotle]
|
12482
|
Molyneux's Question: could a blind man distinguish cube from sphere, if he regained his sight?
[Locke]
|
13005
|
Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities
[Leibniz]
|
23454
|
Appearances have a 'form', which indicates a relational order
[Kant]
|
23231
|
I immediately know myself, and anything beyond that is an inference
[Fichte]
|
6935
|
In man the lowest senses of smell and taste elevate themselves to intellectual acts
[Feuerbach]
|
16859
|
Most perception is one-tenth observation and nine-tenths inference
[Mill]
|
24130
|
An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression
[Nietzsche]
|
18309
|
The evidence of the senses is falsified by reason
[Nietzsche]
|
7628
|
Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory
[Broad, by Maund]
|
15248
|
Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous
[Harré/Madden]
|
12580
|
Experiences have no conceptual content
[Evans, by Greco]
|
7643
|
We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour
[Evans]
|
2465
|
Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved
[Fodor]
|
12579
|
Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts
[Peacocke]
|
4109
|
If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual
[Crane]
|
6362
|
Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
7710
|
Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation
[Lowe]
|
7638
|
One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities
[Maund]
|
7642
|
The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences
[Maund]
|