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Single Idea 12579

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception ]

Full Idea

Perceptual experience has a second layer of nonconceptual representational content, distinct from immediate 'scenarios' and from conceptual contents. These additional contents I call 'protopropositions', containing an individual and a property/relation.

Gist of Idea

Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts

Source

Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992], 3.3)

Book Ref

Peacocke,Christopher: 'A Study of Concepts' [MIT 1999], p.77

A Reaction

When philosophers start writing this sort of thing, I want to turn to neuroscience and psychology. I suppose the philosopher's justification for this sort of speculation is epistemological, but I see no good coming of it.

The 21 ideas from Christopher Peacocke

17722 The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke]
11127 If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke]
9335 Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco]
9336 A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich]
18568 Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery]
18571 Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery]
18572 Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke]
12577 Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke]
12578 A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke]
12581 Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke]
12579 Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke]
12584 An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke]
12585 Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke]
12586 Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke]
12587 Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke]
12605 A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
12604 Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke]
12607 Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
12608 Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke]
12609 Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke]
12610 Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke]