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Full Idea
Perceptual experience has a second layer of nonconceptual representational content, distinct from immediate 'scenarios' and from conceptual contents. These additional contents I call 'protopropositions', containing an individual and a property/relation.
Gist of Idea
Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts
Source
Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992], 3.3)
Book Ref
Peacocke,Christopher: 'A Study of Concepts' [MIT 1999], p.77
A Reaction
When philosophers start writing this sort of thing, I want to turn to neuroscience and psychology. I suppose the philosopher's justification for this sort of speculation is epistemological, but I see no good coming of it.
18568 | Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery] |
18571 | Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery] |
18572 | Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke] |
9335 | Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco] |
9336 | A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich] |
12577 | Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke] |
12578 | A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke] |
12581 | Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke] |
12579 | Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke] |
12584 | An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke] |
12585 | Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke] |
12586 | Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke] |
12587 | Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke] |