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Single Idea 12584

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts ]

Full Idea

At some point a good account of conceptual mastery must tie the mastery to abilities and relations that do not require conceptualization by the thinker.

Gist of Idea

An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized

Source

Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992], 5.3)

Book Ref

Peacocke,Christopher: 'A Study of Concepts' [MIT 1999], p.135

A Reaction

This obviously implies a physicalist commitment. Peacocke seeks, as so many do these days in philosophy of maths, to combine this commitment with some sort of Fregean "platonism without tears" (p.101). I don't buy it.

The 21 ideas from Christopher Peacocke

17722 The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke]
11127 If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke]
9335 Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco]
9336 A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich]
18568 Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery]
18571 Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery]
18572 Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke]
12577 Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke]
12578 A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke]
12581 Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke]
12579 Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke]
12584 An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke]
12585 Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke]
12586 Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke]
12587 Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke]
12605 A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
12604 Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke]
12607 Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
12608 Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke]
12609 Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke]
12610 Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke]