more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
I dispute the view that consciousness of a belief consists in some kind of belief that one has the belief.
Gist of Idea
Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it
Source
Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992], 6.2)
Book Ref
Peacocke,Christopher: 'A Study of Concepts' [MIT 1999], p.152
A Reaction
Thus if one is trying to grasp the notion of higher-order thought, it doesn't have to be just more of same but one level up. Any sensible view of the brain would suggest that one sort of activity would lead into an entirely different sort.
| 18568 | Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery] |
| 18571 | Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery] |
| 18572 | Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke] |
| 9335 | Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco] |
| 9336 | A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich] |
| 12577 | Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke] |
| 12578 | A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke] |
| 12581 | Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke] |
| 12579 | Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke] |
| 12584 | An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke] |
| 12585 | Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke] |
| 12586 | Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke] |
| 12587 | Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke] |