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Single Idea 12589
[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
]
Full Idea
I call my conceptual role semantics 'non-solipsistic' to contrast it with that of authors (Field, Fodor, Loar) who think of conceptual role solipsistically as a completely internal matter.
Gist of Idea
Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter
Source
Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.1)
Book Ref
Harman,Gilbert: 'Reasoning Meaning and Mind' [OUP 1999], p.206
A Reaction
Evidently Harman is influenced by Putnam's Twin Earth, and that meanings ain't in the head, so that the conceptual role has to be extended out into the world to get a good account. I prefer extending into the language community, rather into reality.
The
16 ideas
from '(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics'
12588
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Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality
[Harman]
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12589
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Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter
[Harman]
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12590
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Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication
[Harman]
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12591
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Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication
[Harman]
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12592
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Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication
[Harman]
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12593
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The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences
[Harman]
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12594
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If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one?
[Harman]
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12596
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Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence
[Harman]
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12595
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We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning
[Harman]
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12597
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I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely
[Harman]
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12598
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Reality is the overlap of true complete theories
[Harman]
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12599
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Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them
[Harman]
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12601
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The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter
[Harman]
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12600
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The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts
[Harman]
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12602
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There is no natural border between inner and outer
[Harman]
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12603
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We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world
[Harman]
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