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Single Idea 12590

[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use ]

Full Idea

(Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics is a version of the theory that meaning is use, where the basic use is taken to be in calculation, not in communication, and where concepts are treated as symbols in a 'language of thought'.

Gist of Idea

Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication

Source

Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.1.1)

Book Ref

Harman,Gilbert: 'Reasoning Meaning and Mind' [OUP 1999], p.207


A Reaction

The idea seems to be to connect the highly social Wittgensteinian view of language with the reductive physicalist account of how brains generate concepts. Interesting, thought I never like meaning-as-use.


The 16 ideas from '(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics'

Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman]
Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman]
Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman]
Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman]
Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman]
The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman]
If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman]
Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman]
We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman]
I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman]
Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman]
Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman]
The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman]
The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman]
There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman]
We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman]