more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
In (nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics the content of thought is not in an 'intrinsic nature', but is rather a matter of how mental states are related to each other, to things in the external world, and to things in a context understood as normal.
Gist of Idea
The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts
Source
Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.3.3)
Book Ref
Harman,Gilbert: 'Reasoning Meaning and Mind' [OUP 1999], p.221
A Reaction
This is part of Harman's functional view of consciousness, which I find rather dubious. If things only have identity because of some place in a flow diagram, we must ask why that thing has that place in that diagram.
18818 | Sentence meaning is given by the actions to which it would lead [Ramsey] |
12588 | Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman] |
12589 | Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman] |
12600 | The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman] |
16278 | A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought [Lewis] |
18033 | The meaning of a representation is its role in thought, perception or decisions [Block] |
12634 | 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor] |
3003 | Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor] |
9640 | A term can have not only a sense and a reference, but also a 'computational role' [Brown,JR] |
9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
21641 | Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber] |