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Single Idea 12600

[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role ]

Full Idea

In (nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics the content of thought is not in an 'intrinsic nature', but is rather a matter of how mental states are related to each other, to things in the external world, and to things in a context understood as normal.

Gist of Idea

The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts

Source

Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.3.3)

Book Ref

Harman,Gilbert: 'Reasoning Meaning and Mind' [OUP 1999], p.221

A Reaction

This is part of Harman's functional view of consciousness, which I find rather dubious. If things only have identity because of some place in a flow diagram, we must ask why that thing has that place in that diagram.

The 16 ideas from '(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics'

12588 Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman]
12589 Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman]
12590 Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman]
12591 Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman]
12592 Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman]
12593 The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman]
12594 If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman]
12596 Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman]
12595 We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman]
12597 I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman]
12598 Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman]
12599 Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman]
12601 The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman]
12600 The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman]
12602 There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman]
12603 We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman]