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Single Idea 12600
[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
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Full Idea
In (nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics the content of thought is not in an 'intrinsic nature', but is rather a matter of how mental states are related to each other, to things in the external world, and to things in a context understood as normal.
Gist of Idea
The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts
Source
Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.3.3)
Book Ref
Harman,Gilbert: 'Reasoning Meaning and Mind' [OUP 1999], p.221
A Reaction
This is part of Harman's functional view of consciousness, which I find rather dubious. If things only have identity because of some place in a flow diagram, we must ask why that thing has that place in that diagram.
The
16 ideas
from '(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics'
12588
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Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality
[Harman]
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12589
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Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter
[Harman]
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12590
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Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication
[Harman]
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12591
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Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication
[Harman]
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12592
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Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication
[Harman]
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12593
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The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences
[Harman]
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12594
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If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one?
[Harman]
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12596
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Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence
[Harman]
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12595
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We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning
[Harman]
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12597
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I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely
[Harman]
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12598
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Reality is the overlap of true complete theories
[Harman]
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12599
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Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them
[Harman]
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12601
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The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter
[Harman]
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12600
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The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts
[Harman]
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12602
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There is no natural border between inner and outer
[Harman]
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12603
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We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world
[Harman]
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