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Single Idea 12601
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
]
Full Idea
According to functionalism, the way things look to you is a relational characteristic of your experience, not part of its intrinsic character.
Gist of Idea
The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter
Source
Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.3.3)
Book Ref
Harman,Gilbert: 'Reasoning Meaning and Mind' [OUP 1999], p.223
A Reaction
No, can't make sense of that. How would being in a relation determine what something is? Similar problems with the structuralist account of mathematics. If the whole family love some one cat or one dog, the only difference is intrinsic to the animal.
The
16 ideas
from '(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics'
12588
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Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality
[Harman]
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12589
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Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter
[Harman]
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12590
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Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication
[Harman]
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12591
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Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication
[Harman]
|
12592
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Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication
[Harman]
|
12593
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The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences
[Harman]
|
12594
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If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one?
[Harman]
|
12596
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Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence
[Harman]
|
12595
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We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning
[Harman]
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12597
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I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely
[Harman]
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12598
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Reality is the overlap of true complete theories
[Harman]
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12599
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Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them
[Harman]
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12601
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The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter
[Harman]
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12600
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The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts
[Harman]
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12602
|
There is no natural border between inner and outer
[Harman]
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12603
|
We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world
[Harman]
|