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Single Idea 12604

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts ]

Full Idea

For some particular concept, we can argue that some of its distinctive features are adequately explained only by a possession-condition that involves reference and truth essentially.

Gist of Idea

Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth

Source

Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], Intro)

Book Ref

Peacocke,Christopher: 'Truly Understood' [OUP 2008], p.1


A Reaction

He reached this view via the earlier assertion that it is the role in judgement which key to understanding concepts. I like any view of such things which says that truth plays a role.


The 10 ideas with the same theme [possibility of breaking a concept down into elements]:

Kant implies that concepts have analysable parts [Kant, by Shapiro]
The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce]
We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor]
Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C]
An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke]
Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke]
It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland]
To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green? [Magidor]
The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery]