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Full Idea
My basic Fregean idea is that a sense is individuated by the fundamental condition for something to be its reference.
Gist of Idea
A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference
Source
Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], Intro)
Book Ref
Peacocke,Christopher: 'Truly Understood' [OUP 2008], p.3
A Reaction
For something to actually be its reference (as opposed to imagined reference), truth must be involved. This needs the post-1891 Frege view of such things, and not just the view of concepts as functions which he started with.
| 12605 | A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke] |
| 12604 | Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke] |
| 12607 | Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke] |
| 12608 | Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke] |
| 12609 | Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke] |
| 12610 | Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke] |