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Single Idea 12605

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts ]

Full Idea

My basic Fregean idea is that a sense is individuated by the fundamental condition for something to be its reference.

Gist of Idea

A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference

Source

Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], Intro)

Book Ref

Peacocke,Christopher: 'Truly Understood' [OUP 2008], p.3


A Reaction

For something to actually be its reference (as opposed to imagined reference), truth must be involved. This needs the post-1891 Frege view of such things, and not just the view of concepts as functions which he started with.


The 21 ideas from Christopher Peacocke

The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke]
If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke]
Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco]
A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich]
Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery]
Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery]
Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke]
Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke]
A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke]
Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke]
Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke]
An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke]
Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke]
Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke]
Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke]
A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke]
Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke]
Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke]
Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke]