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Single Idea 12607
[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
]
Full Idea
The Fregean view is that the essence of a concept is given by the fundamental condition for something to be its reference.
Gist of Idea
Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions
Source
Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.1)
Book Ref
Peacocke,Christopher: 'Truly Understood' [OUP 2008], p.54
A Reaction
Peacocke is a supporter of the Fregean view. How does this work for concepts of odd creatures in a fantasy novel? Or for mistaken or confused concepts? For Burge's 'arthritis in my thigh'? I don't reject the Fregean view.
The
21 ideas
from Christopher Peacocke
17722
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The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things
[Peacocke]
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11127
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If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire?
[Peacocke]
|
18568
|
Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession
[Peacocke, by Machery]
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18571
|
Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals
[Peacocke, by Machery]
|
18572
|
Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy
[Machery on Peacocke]
|
9335
|
Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed
[Peacocke, by Greco]
|
9336
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A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions
[Peacocke, by Horwich]
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12577
|
Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it
[Peacocke]
|
12578
|
A concept is just what it is to possess that concept
[Peacocke]
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12581
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Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences
[Peacocke]
|
12579
|
Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts
[Peacocke]
|
12584
|
An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized
[Peacocke]
|
12585
|
Most people can't even define a chair
[Peacocke]
|
12586
|
Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it
[Peacocke]
|
12587
|
Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it
[Peacocke]
|
12604
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Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth
[Peacocke]
|
12605
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A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference
[Peacocke]
|
12607
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Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions
[Peacocke]
|
12608
|
Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality
[Peacocke]
|
12609
|
Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms
[Peacocke]
|
12610
|
Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional
[Peacocke]
|