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Single Idea 12608
[filed under theme 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
]
Full Idea
'Concept' is a notion tied, in the classical Fregean manner, to cognitive significance. Concepts are distinct if we can judge rationally of one, without the other. Concepts are constitutively and definitionally tied to rationality in this way.
Gist of Idea
Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality
Source
Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.2)
Book Ref
Peacocke,Christopher: 'Truly Understood' [OUP 2008], p.60
A Reaction
It seems to a bit optimistic to say, more or less, that thinking is impossible if it isn't rational. Rational beings have been selected for. As Quine nicely observed, duffers at induction have all been weeded out - but they may have existed, briefly.
The
20 ideas
with the same theme
[how we evaluate truth and falsehood]:
6594
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Stoics said that correct judgement needs an invincible criterion of truth
[Stoic school, by Fogelin]
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1884
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If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together
[Sext.Empiricus]
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22108
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First grasp what it is, then its essential features; judgement is their compounding and division
[Aquinas]
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22061
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Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations
[Fichte, by Siep]
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18265
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We don't judge by combining subject and concept; we get a concept by splitting up a judgement
[Frege]
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21725
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The multiple relations theory says assertions about propositions are about their ingredients
[Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B]
|
23474
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A judgement is a complex entity, of mind and various objects
[Russell/Whitehead]
|
23455
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The meaning of 'Socrates is human' is completed by a judgement
[Russell/Whitehead]
|
23480
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The multiple relation theory of judgement couldn't explain the unity of sentences
[Morris,M on Russell/Whitehead]
|
18275
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Only the act of judging completes the meaning of a statement
[Russell/Whitehead]
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5375
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Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things
[Russell]
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21711
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Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
|
5427
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Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents
[Russell]
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17613
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We should judge principles by the science, not science by some fixed principles
[Zermelo]
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13980
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If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment?
[Ryle]
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7535
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If all beliefs are propositional, then belief and judgement are the same thing
[Monk]
|
12608
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Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality
[Peacocke]
|
22273
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Traditionally there are twelve categories of judgement, in groups of three
[Potter]
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13239
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Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject
[Beall/Restall]
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23554
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Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience
[Fricker,M]
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