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Single Idea 12608
[filed under theme 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
]
Full Idea
'Concept' is a notion tied, in the classical Fregean manner, to cognitive significance. Concepts are distinct if we can judge rationally of one, without the other. Concepts are constitutively and definitionally tied to rationality in this way.
Gist of Idea
Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality
Source
Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.2)
Book Ref
Peacocke,Christopher: 'Truly Understood' [OUP 2008], p.60
A Reaction
It seems to a bit optimistic to say, more or less, that thinking is impossible if it isn't rational. Rational beings have been selected for. As Quine nicely observed, duffers at induction have all been weeded out - but they may have existed, briefly.
The
21 ideas
from Christopher Peacocke
17722
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The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things
[Peacocke]
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11127
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If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire?
[Peacocke]
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9335
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Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed
[Peacocke, by Greco]
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9336
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A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions
[Peacocke, by Horwich]
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18568
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Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession
[Peacocke, by Machery]
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18571
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Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals
[Peacocke, by Machery]
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18572
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Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy
[Machery on Peacocke]
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12577
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Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it
[Peacocke]
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12578
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A concept is just what it is to possess that concept
[Peacocke]
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12581
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Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences
[Peacocke]
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12579
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Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts
[Peacocke]
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12584
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An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized
[Peacocke]
|
12585
|
Most people can't even define a chair
[Peacocke]
|
12586
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Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it
[Peacocke]
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12587
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Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it
[Peacocke]
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12605
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A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference
[Peacocke]
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12604
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Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth
[Peacocke]
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12607
|
Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions
[Peacocke]
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12608
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Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality
[Peacocke]
|
12609
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Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms
[Peacocke]
|
12610
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Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional
[Peacocke]
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