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Single Idea 12612
[filed under theme 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
]
Full Idea
For some things, the cause of their necessity is something other than themselves, whereas for others there is no such external cause, but rather they are themselves the necessary cause of other things being the case. The simple is fundamentally necessary.
Gist of Idea
Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities
Source
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1015b14)
Book Ref
Aristotle: 'Metaphysics', ed/tr. Lawson-Tancred,Hugh [Penguin 1998], p.121
A Reaction
What is 'simple' is what terminates an explanation, and that is what-it-is-to-be each thing (its essence). The Greek view of necessity always seems to be a power to which we submit, rather than a passive state like true-in-all-worlds.
Related Idea
Idea 15108
Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[necessity comes from the essence of actual things]:
22505
|
The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four
[Aristotle]
|
12612
|
Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities
[Aristotle]
|
15108
|
Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths
[Aristotle, by Koslicki]
|
17182
|
Necessity is in reference to essence or to cause
[Spinoza]
|
5447
|
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things
[Ellis]
|
13570
|
Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership
[Ellis]
|
11162
|
Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence
[Fine,K]
|
11168
|
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects
[Fine,K]
|
15070
|
It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man
[Fine,K]
|
5449
|
Essentialism is often identified with belief in 'de re' necessary truths
[Mautner]
|
18502
|
If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities
[Heil]
|
16543
|
If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary
[Lowe]
|
16544
|
Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths
[Lowe]
|
19276
|
The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence
[Hale]
|
19293
|
Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures
[Hale]
|
19294
|
If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences?
[Hale]
|
14371
|
We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity
[Jacobs]
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