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Full Idea
I argue for a very strong version of psychological atomism; one according to which what concepts you have is conceptually and metaphysically independent of what epistemic capacities you have.
Gist of Idea
I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.1)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'Concepts: where cognitive science went wrong' [OUP 1998], p.6
A Reaction
This is a frontal assault on the tradition of Frege, Dummett and Peacocke. I immediately find Fodor's approach more congenial, because he wants to say what a concept IS, rather than just place it within some larger scheme of things.
| 6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
| 12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
| 12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
| 12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
| 12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
| 12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
| 12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
| 12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
| 12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
| 12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
| 12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
| 12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |