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Full Idea
Nothing in any mental life could be the concept CAT unless it is satisfied by cats. If you haven't got a concept that applies to cats, that entails that you haven't got the CAT concept.
Gist of Idea
It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.2)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'Concepts: where cognitive science went wrong' [OUP 1998], p.25
A Reaction
Of course, having a concept that applies to cats doesn't entail that you have the CAT concept. Quine's 'gavagai', for example. I think Fodor is right in this idea.
| 6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
| 12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
| 12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
| 12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
| 12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
| 12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
| 12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
| 12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
| 12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
| 12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
| 12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
| 12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |