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Full Idea
The definition theory says that concepts are complex structures which entail their constituents. By saying this, it guarantees both the connection between content and necessity, and the connection between concept individuation and concept possession.
Gist of Idea
Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.5)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'Concepts: where cognitive science went wrong' [OUP 1998], p.88
A Reaction
He cites Pinker as a spokesman for the definitional view. This is the view Fodor attacks, in favour of his atomistic account. He adds in a note that his view also offered to reduce conceptual truth to logical truth.
| 6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
| 12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
| 12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
| 12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
| 12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
| 12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
| 12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
| 12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
| 12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
| 12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
| 12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
| 12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |