more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 12623
[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
]
Full Idea
If the theory theory has a distinctive and coherent answer to the 'What's a concept?' question on offer, it's a well-kept secret.
Gist of Idea
The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.5)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'Concepts: where cognitive science went wrong' [OUP 1998], p.117
A Reaction
Not an argument, but worth recording as an attitude. I certainly agree that accounts which offer some sort of answer to 'What is a concept?' have an immediate head's start on those which don't.
The
16 ideas
with the same theme
[concepts as components of our theories of reality]:
|
8791
|
The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts
[Sellars]
|
|
16511
|
A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept')
[Wiggins]
|
|
12623
|
The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are
[Fodor]
|
|
9335
|
Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed
[Peacocke, by Greco]
|
|
15689
|
Theory-based concepts use rich models to show which similarities really matter
[Gelman]
|
|
17978
|
We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge
[Murphy]
|
|
18687
|
Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn
[Murphy]
|
|
18688
|
Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations
[Murphy]
|
|
18689
|
People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence
[Murphy]
|
|
11137
|
The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles
[Margolis/Laurence]
|
|
11138
|
The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts?
[Margolis/Laurence]
|
|
18587
|
The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach
[Machery]
|
|
18600
|
Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership
[Machery]
|
|
18601
|
Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains
[Machery]
|
|
18607
|
Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities
[Machery]
|
|
18608
|
If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have
[Machery]
|