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Full Idea
If the Representational Theory of Mind is true, then concepts are constituents of beliefs, the units of semantic evaluation, a locus of causal interactions among mental representations, and formulas in Mentalese.
Gist of Idea
In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.2.1)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'LOT 2: the Language of Thought Revisited' [OUP 2008], p.25
A Reaction
I like this aspect of the theory, but then I can't really think of a theory about how the mind works that doesn't make concepts central to it.
| 23225 | The soul's faculties depend on the brain, and are simply the brain's organisation [La Mettrie] |
| 3192 | Basic logic can be done by syntax, with no semantics [Gödel, by Rey] |
| 5495 | Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan] |
| 2331 | Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam] |
| 5804 | A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske] |
| 12632 | In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor] |
| 2993 | Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor] |
| 6539 | The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan] |
| 5496 | Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan] |