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Single Idea 12632

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism ]

Full Idea

If the Representational Theory of Mind is true, then concepts are constituents of beliefs, the units of semantic evaluation, a locus of causal interactions among mental representations, and formulas in Mentalese.

Gist of Idea

In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role

Source

Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.2.1)

Book Ref

Fodor,Jerry A.: 'LOT 2: the Language of Thought Revisited' [OUP 2008], p.25

A Reaction

I like this aspect of the theory, but then I can't really think of a theory about how the mind works that doesn't make concepts central to it.

The 41 ideas from 'LOT 2'

12628 Knowing that must come before knowing how [Fodor]
12630 If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor]
12625 Pragmatism is the worst idea ever [Fodor]
12624 Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor]
12629 For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor]
12627 Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor]
12626 Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor]
12632 In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor]
12633 Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension [Fodor]
12634 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor]
12635 Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor]
12636 Mental states have causal powers [Fodor]
12647 Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor]
12648 Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor]
12650 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor]
12649 We think in file names [Fodor]
12652 Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor]
12651 Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone' [Fodor]
12637 Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor]
12638 If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor]
12642 Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor]
12639 Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor]
12640 Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor]
12641 Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor]
12644 Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy [Fodor]
12643 Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor]
12645 Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor]
12646 Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor]
12654 You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor]
12653 There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor]
12655 Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor]
12656 P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor]
12657 Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor]
12659 Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor]
12660 One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor]
12658 Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor]
12662 We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor]
12661 The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor]
12664 A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor]
12663 We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor]
12631 Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor]