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Full Idea
Pragmatism about concepts really is dead, and the only alternative about concept possession is Cartesianism. That is, it's the thesis that having concept C is being able to think about Cs (as such).
Gist of Idea
Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.2.2)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'LOT 2: the Language of Thought Revisited' [OUP 2008], p.47
A Reaction
I like this. It is very hard to pick out from Fodor the bits where he is clearly right, but this seems to be one of them. I don't like the pragmatic or Wittgensteinian line that having concepts is all about abilities and uses (like sorting or inferring).
| 11873 | Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz] |
| 12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
| 12635 | Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor] |
| 12652 | Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor] |
| 11127 | If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke] |
| 15686 | Labels may indicate categories which embody an essence [Gelman] |
| 11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |