more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 12649
[filed under theme 18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
]
Full Idea
We think in file names.
Gist of Idea
We think in file names
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3 App)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'LOT 2: the Language of Thought Revisited' [OUP 2008], p.95
A Reaction
This is Fodor's new view. He cites Treisman and Schmidt (1982) for raising it, and Pylyshyn (2003) for discussing it. I love it. It exactly fits my introspective view of how I think, and I think it would fit animals. It might not fit some other people!
The
41 ideas
from 'LOT 2'
12625
|
Pragmatism is the worst idea ever
[Fodor]
|
12628
|
Knowing that must come before knowing how
[Fodor]
|
12624
|
Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role
[Fodor]
|
12630
|
If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff
[Fodor]
|
12629
|
For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference
[Fodor]
|
12627
|
Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success
[Fodor]
|
12626
|
Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession
[Fodor]
|
12632
|
In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role
[Fodor]
|
12633
|
Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension
[Fodor]
|
12634
|
'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference
[Fodor]
|
12635
|
Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept
[Fodor]
|
12636
|
Mental states have causal powers
[Fodor]
|
12648
|
Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind
[Fodor]
|
12650
|
'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file
[Fodor]
|
12651
|
Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone'
[Fodor]
|
12652
|
Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter
[Fodor]
|
12649
|
We think in file names
[Fodor]
|
12647
|
Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory
[Fodor]
|
12637
|
Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference
[Fodor]
|
12638
|
If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers
[Fodor]
|
12639
|
Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes
[Fodor]
|
12642
|
Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers
[Fodor]
|
12640
|
Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth
[Fodor]
|
12641
|
Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts
[Fodor]
|
12644
|
Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy
[Fodor]
|
12643
|
Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English
[Fodor]
|
12645
|
Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world
[Fodor]
|
12646
|
Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological
[Fodor]
|
12653
|
There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility
[Fodor]
|
12654
|
You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog'
[Fodor]
|
12655
|
Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them?
[Fodor]
|
12656
|
P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that
[Fodor]
|
12657
|
Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared
[Fodor]
|
12661
|
The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another
[Fodor]
|
12658
|
Nobody knows how concepts are acquired
[Fodor]
|
12662
|
We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype
[Fodor]
|
12659
|
Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product)
[Fodor]
|
12660
|
One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts
[Fodor]
|
12663
|
We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates
[Fodor]
|
12664
|
A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and'
[Fodor]
|
12631
|
Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic
[Fodor]
|