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Single Idea 12653

[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility ]

Full Idea

Statistically, logically, nomologically, conceptually, and metaphysically possible. That's all the kinds of possibility there are this week, but feel free to add others.

Gist of Idea

There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility

Source

Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.4.3)

Book Ref

Fodor,Jerry A.: 'LOT 2: the Language of Thought Revisited' [OUP 2008], p.111

A Reaction

There's also epistemic possibility (possibility 'for all I know'), but I suppose that isn't the real thing. How about 'imaginative possibility' (possibility 'as far as I can imagine')?

Related Idea

Idea 7801 Possibilities can be logical, theoretical, physical, economic or human [Girle]

The 41 ideas from 'LOT 2'

12625 Pragmatism is the worst idea ever [Fodor]
12628 Knowing that must come before knowing how [Fodor]
12624 Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor]
12630 If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor]
12629 For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor]
12627 Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor]
12626 Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor]
12632 In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor]
12633 Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension [Fodor]
12634 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor]
12635 Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor]
12636 Mental states have causal powers [Fodor]
12648 Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor]
12650 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor]
12651 Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone' [Fodor]
12652 Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor]
12649 We think in file names [Fodor]
12647 Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor]
12637 Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor]
12638 If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor]
12639 Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor]
12642 Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor]
12640 Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor]
12641 Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor]
12644 Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy [Fodor]
12643 Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor]
12645 Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor]
12646 Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor]
12653 There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor]
12654 You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor]
12655 Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor]
12656 P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor]
12657 Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor]
12661 The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor]
12658 Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor]
12662 We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor]
12659 Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor]
12660 One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor]
12663 We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor]
12664 A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor]
12631 Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor]