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Full Idea
You can think 'brown dog' without thinking 'cat', but you can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog'.
Gist of Idea
You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog'
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.4.3)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'LOT 2: the Language of Thought Revisited' [OUP 2008], p.112
A Reaction
Fodor is talking about concepts in thought, not about words. The claim is that such concepts have to be compositional, and it is hard to disagree.
| 9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 12654 | You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor] |
| 12609 | Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke] |
| 15690 | Causal properties are seen as more central to category concepts [Gelman] |
| 11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 18566 | Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery] |
| 18584 | One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery] |
| 18585 | Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery] |
| 18578 | Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery] |