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Single Idea 12661

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance ]

Full Idea

The ways in which different kinds of thing are similar to one another aren't, in general, similar to one another.

Gist of Idea

The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another

Source

Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.5.4)

Book Ref

Fodor,Jerry A.: 'LOT 2: the Language of Thought Revisited' [OUP 2008], p.157


A Reaction

Nice, but I think one would say that they lack similarity at the level of primary thought, but have obvious similarity (as concept-connectors) at the level of meta-thought.

Related Idea

Idea 4441 'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell]


The 12 ideas with the same theme [seeing recurrences of properties and structures]:

Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato]
General ideas are the connection by resemblance to some particular [Hume]
Hume does not distinguish real resemblances among degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume]
A picture of a friend strengthens our idea of him, by resemblance [Hume]
Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume]
We don't recognise comparisons by something in our minds; the concepts result from the comparisons [Mill]
I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red [Russell]
General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine]
To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine]
Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine]
Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine]
The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor]