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Single Idea 12661
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
]
Full Idea
The ways in which different kinds of thing are similar to one another aren't, in general, similar to one another.
Gist of Idea
The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.5.4)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'LOT 2: the Language of Thought Revisited' [OUP 2008], p.157
A Reaction
Nice, but I think one would say that they lack similarity at the level of primary thought, but have obvious similarity (as concept-connectors) at the level of meta-thought.
Related Idea
Idea 4441
'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell]
The
170 ideas
from Jerry A. Fodor
6650
|
Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts
[Fodor, by Lowe]
|
12615
|
Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images
[Fodor]
|
12614
|
I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities
[Fodor]
|
12613
|
Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result'
[Fodor]
|
12617
|
Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved
[Fodor]
|
12616
|
English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts
[Fodor]
|
12618
|
It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats
[Fodor]
|
12619
|
We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words
[Fodor]
|
12620
|
If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers
[Fodor]
|
12621
|
Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession
[Fodor]
|
12623
|
The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are
[Fodor]
|
12622
|
Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones
[Fodor]
|
2465
|
Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved
[Fodor]
|
2469
|
The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains)
[Fodor]
|
2467
|
Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation
[Fodor]
|
2468
|
Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism
[Fodor]
|
2471
|
Are concepts best seen as capacities?
[Fodor]
|
2472
|
For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something
[Fodor]
|
2473
|
Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction
[Fodor]
|
2470
|
Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q
[Fodor]
|
2474
|
It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it
[Fodor]
|
2475
|
Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example
[Fodor]
|
2476
|
The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories
[Fodor]
|
2477
|
If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end?
[Fodor]
|
2484
|
The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work
[Fodor]
|
2482
|
It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states
[Fodor]
|
2483
|
Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning
[Fodor]
|
2486
|
Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content
[Fodor]
|
2481
|
Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything
[Fodor]
|
2485
|
Do intentional states explain our behaviour?
[Fodor]
|
2487
|
Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language
[Fodor]
|
2480
|
Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't
[Fodor]
|
2489
|
Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers
[Fodor]
|
2490
|
Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas'
[Fodor]
|
2491
|
Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness
[Fodor]
|
2492
|
Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience
[Fodor]
|
2493
|
According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process
[Fodor]
|
2494
|
Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it
[Fodor]
|
2496
|
Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts
[Fodor]
|
2498
|
Modules make the world manageable
[Fodor]
|
2497
|
Something must take an overview of the modules
[Fodor]
|
2495
|
Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation
[Fodor]
|
2499
|
Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do
[Fodor]
|
2500
|
Babies talk in consistent patterns
[Fodor]
|
2502
|
How do you count beliefs?
[Fodor]
|
2501
|
Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images
[Fodor]
|
2504
|
Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure
[Fodor]
|
2503
|
Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality
[Fodor]
|
2508
|
The function of a mind is obvious
[Fodor]
|
2507
|
Rationality rises above modules
[Fodor]
|
2505
|
Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax)
[Fodor]
|
2509
|
Modules have in-built specialist information
[Fodor]
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2506
|
If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them!
[Fodor]
|
2432
|
Is content basically information, fixed externally?
[Fodor]
|
2434
|
Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation
[Fodor]
|
2433
|
For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning
[Fodor]
|
2436
|
It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth)
[Fodor]
|
2435
|
Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving
[Fodor]
|
2437
|
XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility
[Fodor]
|
2438
|
In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions
[Fodor]
|
2439
|
Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences
[Fodor]
|
2440
|
Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way
[Fodor]
|
2441
|
Truth conditions require a broad concept of content
[Fodor]
|
2442
|
Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world
[Fodor]
|
2463
|
A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality
[Fodor]
|
2458
|
Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs
[Fodor]
|
2446
|
Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle
[Fodor]
|
2459
|
Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is
[Fodor]
|
2451
|
To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true
[Fodor]
|
2461
|
An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time
[Fodor]
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2443
|
I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation
[Fodor]
|
2453
|
We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts
[Fodor]
|
2457
|
If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs
[Fodor]
|
2462
|
Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs
[Fodor]
|
2454
|
We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments
[Fodor]
|
2455
|
Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused
[Fodor]
|
2460
|
Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean
[Fodor]
|
2450
|
Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment
[Fodor]
|
2445
|
Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again
[Fodor]
|
2447
|
Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind
[Fodor]
|
2452
|
Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content
[Fodor]
|
2464
|
Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds
[Fodor]
|
3114
|
Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff
[Fodor]
|
11143
|
If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started
[Fodor, by Margolis/Laurence]
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8090
|
Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form
[Fodor, by Devlin]
|
12624
|
Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role
[Fodor]
|
12630
|
If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff
[Fodor]
|
12628
|
Knowing that must come before knowing how
[Fodor]
|
12625
|
Pragmatism is the worst idea ever
[Fodor]
|
12629
|
For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference
[Fodor]
|
12627
|
Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success
[Fodor]
|
12626
|
Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession
[Fodor]
|
12632
|
In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role
[Fodor]
|
12633
|
Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension
[Fodor]
|
12634
|
'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference
[Fodor]
|
12635
|
Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept
[Fodor]
|
12636
|
Mental states have causal powers
[Fodor]
|
12651
|
Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone'
[Fodor]
|
12649
|
We think in file names
[Fodor]
|
12648
|
Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind
[Fodor]
|
12650
|
'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file
[Fodor]
|
12652
|
Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter
[Fodor]
|
12647
|
Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory
[Fodor]
|
12637
|
Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference
[Fodor]
|
12638
|
If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers
[Fodor]
|
12639
|
Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes
[Fodor]
|
12642
|
Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers
[Fodor]
|
12640
|
Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth
[Fodor]
|
12641
|
Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts
[Fodor]
|
12643
|
Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English
[Fodor]
|
12644
|
Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy
[Fodor]
|
12645
|
Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world
[Fodor]
|
12646
|
Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological
[Fodor]
|
12653
|
There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility
[Fodor]
|
12654
|
You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog'
[Fodor]
|
12655
|
Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them?
[Fodor]
|
12656
|
P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that
[Fodor]
|
12657
|
Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared
[Fodor]
|
12662
|
We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype
[Fodor]
|
12658
|
Nobody knows how concepts are acquired
[Fodor]
|
12659
|
Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product)
[Fodor]
|
12660
|
One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts
[Fodor]
|
12661
|
The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another
[Fodor]
|
12664
|
A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and'
[Fodor]
|
12663
|
We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates
[Fodor]
|
12631
|
Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic
[Fodor]
|
2597
|
Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws
[Fodor]
|
2598
|
Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be?
[Fodor]
|
2599
|
Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true
[Fodor]
|
22186
|
Mental modules are specialised, automatic, and isolated
[Fodor, by Okasha]
|
3975
|
Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire
[Fodor]
|
3976
|
Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws
[Fodor]
|
3977
|
Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances
[Fodor]
|
3980
|
Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols
[Fodor]
|
3978
|
Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together
[Fodor]
|
3981
|
Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable
[Fodor]
|
3982
|
How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties?
[Fodor]
|
2604
|
We must have expressive power BEFORE we learn language
[Fodor]
|
5498
|
Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents
[Fodor, by Lycan]
|
7326
|
Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things
[Fodor]
|
7014
|
A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties
[Fodor]
|
15494
|
We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining
[Fodor]
|
2990
|
Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned
[Fodor]
|
2991
|
Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought
[Fodor]
|
2992
|
We may be able to explain rationality mechanically
[Fodor]
|
2993
|
Any piece of software can always be hard-wired
[Fodor]
|
2994
|
In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be
[Fodor]
|
2995
|
Supervenience gives good support for mental causation
[Fodor]
|
2996
|
Mental states may have the same content but different extensions
[Fodor]
|
2998
|
Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express
[Fodor]
|
2999
|
Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism
[Fodor]
|
3000
|
Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine
[Fodor]
|
3001
|
Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation
[Fodor]
|
3002
|
If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought?
[Fodor]
|
3003
|
Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role
[Fodor]
|
3004
|
The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude
[Fodor]
|
3005
|
'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties
[Fodor]
|
3006
|
Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth
[Fodor]
|
3007
|
Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value
[Fodor]
|
3008
|
Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial
[Fodor]
|
3009
|
Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals
[Fodor]
|
3010
|
Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese
[Fodor]
|
3011
|
Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states
[Fodor]
|
3012
|
Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles?
[Fodor]
|
2988
|
Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have
[Fodor]
|
2983
|
Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so
[Lyons on Fodor]
|
3135
|
Is thought a syntactic computation using representations?
[Fodor, by Rey]
|
15473
|
How does anything get outside itself?
[Fodor, by Martin,CB]
|
2981
|
Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese?
[Lyons on Fodor]
|
2985
|
Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"?
[Lyons on Fodor]
|