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Full Idea
I'm inclined to think that 'and' is defined by its truth-table (and not, for example, by its 'inferential-role').
Gist of Idea
A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and'
Source
Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.7)
Book Ref
Fodor,Jerry A.: 'LOT 2: the Language of Thought Revisited' [OUP 2008], p.199
A Reaction
Sounds right, on my general principle that something can only have a function if it has an intrinsic nature. The truth-table just formalises normal understanding of 'and', according to what it makes true.
16967 | 'Are Coriscus and Callias at home?' sounds like a single question, but it isn't [Aristotle] |
17895 | Combining two distinct assertions does not necessarily lead to a single 'complex proposition' [Mill] |
18718 | Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein] |
12597 | I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman] |
12664 | A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor] |
12010 | Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G] |
23628 | The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack] |