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Single Idea 12664

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and ]

Full Idea

I'm inclined to think that 'and' is defined by its truth-table (and not, for example, by its 'inferential-role').

Gist of Idea

A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and'

Source

Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.7)

Book Ref

Fodor,Jerry A.: 'LOT 2: the Language of Thought Revisited' [OUP 2008], p.199

A Reaction

Sounds right, on my general principle that something can only have a function if it has an intrinsic nature. The truth-table just formalises normal understanding of 'and', according to what it makes true.

The 7 ideas with the same theme [role of 'and' in systems of logic]:

16967 'Are Coriscus and Callias at home?' sounds like a single question, but it isn't [Aristotle]
17895 Combining two distinct assertions does not necessarily lead to a single 'complex proposition' [Mill]
18718 Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein]
12597 I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman]
12664 A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor]
12010 Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G]
23628 The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack]