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Single Idea 12665

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties ]

Full Idea

I want to insist on the existence of a class of categorical properties distinct from causal powers. This is contentious, for there is a growing body of opinion that all properties are causal powers.

Gist of Idea

I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers

Source

Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], Intro)

Book Ref

Ellis,Brian: 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism' [Acument 2009], p.2


A Reaction

Alexander Bird makes a case against categorical properties. If what is meant is that 'being an electron' is the key property of an electron, then I disagree (quite strongly) with Ellis. Ellis says they are needed to explain causal powers.


The 25 ideas from 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism'

Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE]
I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis]
Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis]
We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis]
Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis]
Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis]
Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis]
A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis]
Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis]
I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis]
Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis]
There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis]
Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis]
Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis]
Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis]
A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis]
Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis]
Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis]
Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis]
Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis]
Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis]
The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis]
Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis]