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Single Idea 12669

[filed under theme 14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science ]

Full Idea

The primary aim of science is to explain what happens, not just to describe it.

Gist of Idea

Science aims to explain things, not just describe them

Source

Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2)

Book Ref

Ellis,Brian: 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism' [Acument 2009], p.25


A Reaction

This I take to be a good motto for scientific essentialism. Any scientist who is happy with anything less than explanation is a mere journeyman, a servant in the kitchens of the great house of science.


The 25 ideas from 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism'

Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE]
I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis]
Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis]
We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis]
Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis]
Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis]
Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis]
A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis]
Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis]
I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis]
Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis]
There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis]
Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis]
Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis]
Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis]
A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis]
Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis]
Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis]
Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis]
Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis]
Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis]
The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis]
Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis]