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Single Idea 12672
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
]
Full Idea
To regard properties as sets of individuals, and relations as sets of ordered individuals, is to make a nonsense of the whole idea of discovering a new property or relationship. Sets are defined or constructed, not discovered.
Gist of Idea
Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals
Source
Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2)
Book Ref
Ellis,Brian: 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism' [Acument 2009], p.44
A Reaction
This bizarre view of properties (as sets) drives me crazy, until it dawns on you that they are just using the word 'property' in a different way, probably coextensively with 'predicate', in order to make the logic work.
The
25 ideas
from 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism'
23781
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Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes
[Ellis, by Williams,NE]
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12665
|
I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers
[Ellis]
|
12667
|
Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability
[Ellis]
|
12666
|
We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation
[Ellis]
|
12668
|
Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true
[Ellis]
|
12669
|
Science aims to explain things, not just describe them
[Ellis]
|
12670
|
A physical event is any change of distribution of energy
[Ellis]
|
12673
|
Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act
[Ellis]
|
12672
|
Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals
[Ellis]
|
12671
|
I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal
[Ellis]
|
12674
|
Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism
[Ellis]
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12681
|
There are natural kinds of processes
[Ellis]
|
12680
|
Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level
[Ellis]
|
12675
|
Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave
[Ellis]
|
12676
|
Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power
[Ellis]
|
12682
|
Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions
[Ellis]
|
12684
|
Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal
[Ellis]
|
12679
|
A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties
[Ellis]
|
12683
|
Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes
[Ellis]
|
12685
|
Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent
[Ellis]
|
12686
|
Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties
[Ellis]
|
12687
|
Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things
[Ellis]
|
12688
|
Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things
[Ellis]
|
12689
|
Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang
[Ellis]
|
12690
|
The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang
[Ellis]
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