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Single Idea 12685

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object ]

Full Idea

I would define categorical properties as those whose identities depend only on the kinds of structures they represent.

Gist of Idea

Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent

Source

Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3 n8)

Book Ref

Ellis,Brian: 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism' [Acument 2009], p.70


A Reaction

Aha. So categorical properties would be much more perspicaciously labelled as 'structural' properties. Why does philosophical terminology make it all more difficult than it needs to be?


The 15 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about how objects must be structured]:

Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB]
Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB]
Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis]
All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer]
We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis]
If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis]
The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis]
The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis]
Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis]
Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis]
We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis]
Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar]
There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar]
Pandispositionalists say structures are clusters of causal powers [Mumford/Anjum]