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Single Idea 12721

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique ]

Full Idea

Concerning bodies I can demonstrate that not merely light, heat, color, and similar qualities are apparent but also motion, figure, and extension.

Gist of Idea

Light, heat and colour are apparent qualities, and so are motion, figure and extension

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (De modo distinguendi phaenomena [1685], A6.4.1504), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4

Book Ref

Garber,Daniel: 'Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad' [OUP 2009], p.155


A Reaction

Leibniz is not consistent on this. Here he is flirting with idealism, but he often backs away from that. In Discourse §12 he makes secondary qualities certainly subjective, and primary qualities possibly so. He admits the primaries contain eternal truths.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [criticism of the primary/secondary distinction]:

Light, heat and colour are apparent qualities, and so are motion, figure and extension [Leibniz]
Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz]
A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny [Berkeley]
The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object [Berkeley]
'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses [Berkeley]
Distance is not directly perceived by sight [Berkeley]
No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley]
Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley]
Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley]
If secondary qualities (e.g. hardness) are in the mind, so are primary qualities like extension [Hume]
I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant]
We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J]
For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J]
We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton]
If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton]
Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil]
If subjective and objective begin to merge, then so do primary and secondary qualities [Svendsen]