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Single Idea 12730

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied ]

Full Idea

We will not seek for the reason of natural things from the end which God or nature has set before him in their creation .

Gist of Idea

We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes

Source

René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], §28)

Book Ref

Descartes,René: 'Philosophical Essays and Correspondence', ed/tr. Ariew,Roger [Hackett 2000], p.238


A Reaction

Teleology is more relevant to biology than to the other sciences, and it is hard to understand an eye without a notion of 'what it is for'. Planetary motion reveals nothing about purposes. If you demand a purpose, it becomes more baffling.


The 14 ideas with the same theme [no aspect of nature contains genuine purpose]:

Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk]
Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle]
Only Epicurus denied purpose in nature, for the whole world, or for its parts [Epicurus, by Annas]
Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon]
We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes]
For Spinoza eyes don't act for purposes, but follow mechanical necessity [Roochnik on Spinoza]
Spinoza strongly attacked teleology, which is the lifeblood of classical logos [Roochnik on Spinoza]
Final causes are figments of human imagination [Spinoza]
The sun and rain weren't made for us; they sometimes burn us, or spoil our seeds [La Mettrie]
If the world aimed at an end, it would have reached it by now [Nietzsche]
'Purpose' is just a human fiction [Nietzsche]
The only human purpose is that created by our genetic history [Wilson,EO]
Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle]
People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan]