more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
A pair of diamonds is merely an entity of reason, and even if one of them is brought close to another, it is an entity of imagination or perception, that is to say a phenomenon; contiguity, common movement and the same end don't make substantial unity.
Gist of Idea
We find unity in reason, and unity in perception, but these are not true unity
Source
Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1687.04.30), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
Book Ref
Garber,Daniel: 'Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad' [OUP 2009], p.295
A Reaction
This invites the question of what you have to do to two objects to give them substantial unity. The distinction between unity 'of reason' and unity 'of perception' is good.
| 15856 | A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato] |
| 17839 | Some things are unified by their account, which rests on a unified thought about the thing [Aristotle] |
| 2297 | If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality [Descartes] |
| 13160 | To exist and be understood, a multitude must first be reduced to a unity [Leibniz] |
| 12746 | We find unity in reason, and unity in perception, but these are not true unity [Leibniz] |
| 12035 | Leibniz bases pure primitive entities on conjunctions of qualitative properties [Leibniz, by Adams,RM] |
| 20362 | We saw unity in things because our ego seemed unified (but now we doubt the ego!) [Nietzsche] |
| 14252 | We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K] |
| 13332 | Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K] |
| 14928 | Things are abstractions from structures [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14481 | Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson] |