more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 12751

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads ]

Full Idea

It is never clear in the 'Monadologie' how exactly the world of extended bodies is related to the world of simple substances, the world of non-extended and mind-like monads.

Gist of Idea

It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads.

Source

comment on Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 9

Book Ref

Garber,Daniel: 'Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad' [OUP 2009], p.355


A Reaction

Leibniz was always going to hit the interaction problem, as soon as he started giving an increasingly spiritual account of what a substance, and hence marginalising the 'force' which had held centre-stage earlier on. Presumably they are 'parallel'.


The 24 ideas with the same theme [minimal purposeful units as basic to existence]:

Substances are in harmony, because they each express the one reality in themselves [Leibniz]
The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie on Leibniz]
He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Leibniz, by Wiggins]
Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire on Leibniz]
It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber on Leibniz]
Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance [Leibniz]
A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory [Leibniz]
A monad and its body are living, so life is everywhere, and comes in infinite degrees [Leibniz]
Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points [Leibniz]
All substances analyse down to simple substances, which are souls, or 'monads' [Leibniz]
A piece of flint contains something resembling perceptions and appetites [Leibniz]
Entelechies are analogous to souls, as other minds are analogous to our own minds [Leibniz]
All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz]
Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz]
Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz]
Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz]
Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz]
Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz]
Leibniz proposes monads, since there must be basic things, which are immaterial in order to have unity [Leibniz, by Jolley]
If some sort of experience is at the root of matter, then human knowledge is close to its essence [Nietzsche]
Husserl sees the ego as a monad, unifying presence, sense and intentional acts [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Epicurean atomists say body is sensible, to distinguish it from space. [Garber]
In 1676 it was discovered that water is teeming with life [Krauss]
Leibnizian monads qualify as Kantian noumena [Gardner]