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Single Idea 12760

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism ]

Full Idea

Nor is there any reason why souls or things analogous to souls should not be everywhere, even if dominant and consequently intelligent souls, like human souls, cannot be everywhere.

Gist of Idea

Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura) [1698], §12)

Book Ref

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'Philosophical Essays', ed/tr. Arlew,R /Garber,D [Hackett 1989], p.163


A Reaction

He is always flirting with panpsychism, though he doesn't seem to offer any account of how these little baby souls can be built up to create one intelligent soul, the latter being indivisible. 'Souls' are very different from things 'analous to souls'!


The 12 ideas with the same theme [all matter has a mental aspect to it]:

Wisdom and thought are shared by all things [Empedocles]
The earth is and always has been an insentient being [Lucretius]
Particles may have sensation, but eggs turning into chicks suggests otherwise [Lucretius]
That all matter thinks is absurd, and would make each part of our bodies a distinct self-consciousness [Bentley]
Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz]
Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz]
Leibniz has a panpsychist view that physical points are spiritual [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi]
Nature contains a fundamental force of thought [Fichte]
Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce]
Can phenomenal qualities exist unsensed? [Lockwood]
Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn]
It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers]