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Single Idea 12764
[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
]
Full Idea
If we are to make sense of the bare particular theory, a property must be not just a rule for grouping individuals, but a feature of individuals in virtue of which they may be grouped.
Gist of Idea
For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects
Source
Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.76)
Book Ref
Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.76
A Reaction
He is offering an objection to the thoroughly extensional account of properties that is found in standard possible worlds semantics. Quite right too. We can't give up on the common sense notion of a property.
The
65 ideas
from Robert C. Stalnaker
12762
|
Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics
[Stalnaker]
|
12761
|
An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists
[Stalnaker]
|
12763
|
Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential
[Stalnaker]
|
12764
|
For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects
[Stalnaker]
|
12765
|
Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball
[Stalnaker]
|
12766
|
Logical space is abstracted from the actual world
[Stalnaker]
|
18052
|
An assertion aims to add to the content of a context
[Stalnaker, by Magidor]
|
14718
|
An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning
[Stalnaker, by Schroeter]
|
16422
|
The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts
[Stalnaker]
|
16423
|
Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of
[Stalnaker]
|
16421
|
Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part
[Stalnaker]
|
16429
|
A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time
[Stalnaker]
|
16430
|
Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension
[Stalnaker]
|
16428
|
Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract
[Stalnaker]
|
16431
|
In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content
[Stalnaker]
|
16432
|
One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content
[Stalnaker]
|
18823
|
To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan
[Stalnaker, by Rumfitt]
|
16409
|
Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory
[Stalnaker]
|
16411
|
If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time
[Stalnaker]
|
16412
|
If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism
[Stalnaker]
|
16410
|
Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension
[Stalnaker]
|
16433
|
Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones?
[Stalnaker]
|
16436
|
Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics
[Stalnaker]
|
16434
|
Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist
[Stalnaker]
|
16437
|
Possible worlds are properties
[Stalnaker]
|
16438
|
Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them
[Stalnaker]
|
16439
|
A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location
[Stalnaker]
|
16440
|
I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance
[Stalnaker]
|
16443
|
Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified
[Stalnaker]
|
16444
|
Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure
[Stalnaker]
|
16445
|
I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space
[Stalnaker]
|
16442
|
I take propositions to be truth conditions
[Stalnaker]
|
16447
|
A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth
[Stalnaker]
|
16446
|
Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist
[Stalnaker]
|
16448
|
Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it
[Stalnaker]
|
16449
|
In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members
[Stalnaker]
|
16450
|
Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions
[Stalnaker]
|
16452
|
Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually
[Stalnaker]
|
16453
|
The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties
[Stalnaker]
|
16454
|
Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics
[Stalnaker]
|
16461
|
We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language
[Stalnaker]
|
16464
|
We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities
[Stalnaker]
|
16465
|
In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't
[Stalnaker]
|
16466
|
Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false
[Stalnaker]
|
16467
|
'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human
[Stalnaker]
|
16468
|
Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities
[Stalnaker]
|
16471
|
I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties
[Stalnaker]
|
16474
|
How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know?
[Stalnaker]
|
14616
|
A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations
[Stalnaker]
|
14617
|
Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist
[Stalnaker]
|
15793
|
We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology
[Stalnaker, by Lycan]
|
16396
|
Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical
[Stalnaker]
|
16403
|
'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts
[Stalnaker]
|
16397
|
If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways
[Stalnaker]
|
16399
|
Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains
[Stalnaker]
|
16398
|
Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries
[Stalnaker]
|
16401
|
To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true
[Stalnaker]
|
16406
|
If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean
[Stalnaker]
|
16404
|
In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent
[Stalnaker]
|
16405
|
To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient?
[Stalnaker]
|
16407
|
Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular
[Stalnaker]
|
16408
|
Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals
[Stalnaker]
|
14285
|
A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs
[Stalnaker]
|
14286
|
In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false
[Stalnaker]
|
10994
|
Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent
[Stalnaker, by Read]
|