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Single Idea 12766

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic ]

Full Idea

Logical space is not given independently of the individuals that occupy it, but is abstracted from the world as we find it.

Gist of Idea

Logical space is abstracted from the actual world

Source

Robert C. Stalnaker (Anti-essentialism [1979], p.85)

Book Ref

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.85


A Reaction

I very much like the second half of this idea, and am delighted to find Stalnaker endorsing it. I take the logical connectives to be descriptions of how things behave, at a high level of generality.


The 6 ideas from 'Anti-essentialism'

An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker]
Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker]
Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker]
Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker]
Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker]