more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 12768

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic ]

Full Idea

The choice among theories in science may be a choice to accept in some sense falling far short of endorsement as true.

Gist of Idea

We accept many scientific theories without endorsing them as true

Source

Bas C. van Fraassen (The Empirical Stance [2002], 1.5)

Book Ref

Fraassen,Bas van: 'The Empirical Stance' [Yale 2002], p.14


A Reaction

When put like this, it is hard to deny the force of Van Fraassen's reservations about science. Lots of people, including me, use scientific theories as working assumptions for life, with nothing like full confidence in their truth.


The 9 ideas with the same theme [explanation as entirely related to human curiosity]:

Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative [Martin,CB]
You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam]
We accept many scientific theories without endorsing them as true [Fraassen]
An explanation is just descriptive information answering a particular question [Fraassen, by Salmon]
Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben]
Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford]
Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner [Psillos]
An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event [Psillos]
Maybe explanation is so subjective that it cannot be a part of science [Bird]