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Single Idea 12793

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff ]

Full Idea

With their 'mass-noun' ontologies, the early pre-Socratics were blind to plurality ...but the count-noun ontologists came to dominate the field forever after.

Gist of Idea

Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns

Source

José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6)

Book Ref

Benardete,José A.: 'Metaphysics: The Logical Approach' [OUP 1989], p.36


A Reaction

The mass-nouns are such things as earth, air, fire and water. This is a very interesting historical observation (cited by Laycock). Our obsession with identity seems tied to formal logic. There is a whole other worldview waiting out there.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [general masses which are fairly homogeneous]:

A composite is a true unity if all of its parts fall under one essence [Scheibler]
Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden]
We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis]
Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis]
I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen]
Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA]
If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien]
Mass words do not have plurals, or numerical adjectives, or use 'fewer' [Hart,WD]
Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider]
Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons]
Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons]
Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons]
The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki]