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Single Idea 12793
[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
]
Full Idea
With their 'mass-noun' ontologies, the early pre-Socratics were blind to plurality ...but the count-noun ontologists came to dominate the field forever after.
Gist of Idea
Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns
Source
José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 6)
Book Ref
Benardete,José A.: 'Metaphysics: The Logical Approach' [OUP 1989], p.36
A Reaction
The mass-nouns are such things as earth, air, fire and water. This is a very interesting historical observation (cited by Laycock). Our obsession with identity seems tied to formal logic. There is a whole other worldview waiting out there.
The
26 ideas
from José A. Benardete
3358
|
Metaphysics focuses on Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism
[Benardete,JA]
|
3304
|
Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones?
[Benardete,JA]
|
3308
|
In the ontological argument a full understanding of the concept of God implies a contradiction in 'There is no God'
[Benardete,JA]
|
3306
|
The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction
[Benardete,JA]
|
3310
|
If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist
[Benardete,JA]
|
12793
|
Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns
[Benardete,JA]
|
3309
|
If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow?
[Benardete,JA]
|
3312
|
There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier)
[Benardete,JA]
|
3314
|
Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself?
[Benardete,JA]
|
3323
|
Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent
[Benardete,JA]
|
3329
|
Presumably the statements of science are true, but should they be taken literally or not?
[Benardete,JA]
|
3326
|
Set theory attempts to reduce the 'is' of predication to mathematics
[Benardete,JA]
|
3327
|
The set of Greeks is included in the set of men, but isn't a member of it
[Benardete,JA]
|
3330
|
Negatives, rationals, irrationals and imaginaries are all postulated to solve baffling equations
[Benardete,JA]
|
3332
|
Greeks saw the science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic
[Benardete,JA]
|
3334
|
Rationalists see points as fundamental, but empiricists prefer regions
[Benardete,JA]
|
3337
|
Natural numbers are seen in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory)
[Benardete,JA]
|
3335
|
The standard Z-F Intuition version of set theory has about ten agreed axioms
[Benardete,JA, by PG]
|
3349
|
If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects
[Benardete,JA]
|
3341
|
Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori'
[Benardete,JA]
|
3344
|
Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic
[Benardete,JA]
|
3345
|
Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge
[Benardete,JA]
|
3350
|
Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist?
[Benardete,JA]
|
3351
|
One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water
[Benardete,JA]
|
3353
|
If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them?
[Benardete,JA]
|
3352
|
Analytical philosophy analyses separate concepts successfully, but lacks a synoptic vision of the results
[Benardete,JA]
|